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When the question of the “religion of art”, with all its multiple dimensions and vari­
ous meanings, is compared to a chaotic constellation of objects of varying brightness 
against the background of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual life, 
Johann Joachim Winckelmann undoubtedly shines as its brightest star. Regardless of 
whether he indeed merited the title of the founding father of the history of art and 
archaeology, the German antiquarian and connoisseur of antiquities gave a power­
ful impulse to appreciation of the act of experiencing art and beauty (which to him 
were quite inseparable). This impulse made it possible to confer on art the attributes 
of a religious experience, a fullness which encompassed the entire human life in the 
totality and unity of all cognitive faculties.1 These facilities included zeal, depth and 
intensity of experience, and finally the uncompromising, jealous exclusivity and de­
tachment all else that earlier (and later as well) were forcibly pushed into the frame 
of the extensible and capacious notion of “disinterestedness”. It is obvious that the 
above attributes are not homogenous in nature: the totality and unity of cognitive 
faculties is, in reality, an ideal state, a synonym of fulfilment or happiness. Stend­
hal, an expert in this field, was most probably right in observing that beauty is only 
“a promise of happiness”; the force of an experience is psychological in its character 
and depends less on history than on aesthetics, understood, according to Baumgar­
ten, as sensitivity of the senses and imagination. The carefully guarded autonomy and 
purity of this experience could be seen as an argument for the autonomy of the arts 
(Edgar Wind’s “aesthetic detachment”2), but also in the contrary manner: as part of 
the debate whether the will is excluded from it, since the desire for beauty (i.e. art) is 
a love, an “erotic” desire in the sense as old and noble as Plato’s Symposium. Finally,
1 Winckelmann assumed a theory of beauty rooted in neo-Platonism, and hence was able to give 
unifying features and quasi-mystical character to the experience of beauty. Hence he also avoid­
ed open discussion of what was the true source of a religious experience: whether it was zeal 
and earnestness of feeling (cf. “For the zeal of thine house hath eaten me up”, Ps 69:9) or rather 
the cognitive reflection on divine matters; on this question, in the complex context of piety, see 
E. Muller, Asthetische Religiositat und Kunstreligion in den Philosophien von der Aufkliirung bis 
zum Ausgangdes deutschen Idealismus, Berlin, 2004, pp. 45-63. See also: E.H. Gombrich, Kunst 
und Fortschritt. Wirkung und Wandlung einer Idee, 2nd ed., Cologne, 1987, pp. 32-34.
2 See E. Wind, Art and Anarchy. The Reith Lectures 1960, London, 1963, chapters 2 and 3.
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it is worth observing that none of these categories clearly delineate the boundaries of 
a religious and artistic experience.
The difficulty does not lie in separating these two spheres of experience and 
breaking with the Enlightenment and Romantic notion of the “refigion of art”. It is, of 
course, possible to surround the religious experience with a palisade of a “numinotic 
experience” - something that exceeds a human being absolutely, in which he will look 
for the ultimate anchor for himself and the universe - and from behind that palisade 
to resist the temptations of the other forms of experience that would happily assume 
the nobility and fullness of a religious experience and find a place in a temple’s ady­
tum. This fear of dethronement is not, however, the fear of a historian. The notion of 
the “religion of art”, hotly contested during the period in question, is now a historical 
one; it no longer arouses such controversy, and it seems that it was once dreaded due 
not to a fear of appropriation, but a fear of the blurring of boundaries and the usurp­
ing pretences of art.
It is, however, obvious that the matters may have taken quite a different course. 
Winckelmann’s message turned out to be at least ambiguous. It would be difficult 
to assume that his aim was, outright and foremost, to provide, hidden behind the 
apology of artistic beauty, a critique of religion from the Enlightenment point of view. 
He would then have to be viewed as the creator of an aesthetic quasi-religion (there 
would be, indeed, few parallels to a traditional religion in its contents). Winckel­
mann’s clear and meaningful criticism of religious institutions and the behaviour that 
they force the believers to assume is found mainly in his construction of history and 
in his justification of the indisputable, in his opinion, artistic, intellectual and moral 
perfection of the Greeks - which, in effect, led to the criticism of the culture of his 
own times. If the “religion of art” is by definition a challenge to the traditional forms 
of religion, in Winckelmann’s case the battlefield is culture.
This is precisely how this was viewed by his contemporaries. When Hegel said that 
Winckelmann had liberated art from the tyranny of “den Gesichtspunkten gemeiner 
Zwecke und blofien Naturnachahmung”, giving human spirit “ein neues Organ und 
ganz neue Betrachtungsweisen”3 to experience art, he was clearly aware of the role 
of the author of Reflections on the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks. Yet Hegel saw 
him from the distance of nearly half a century, from which Winckelmann’s biography 
was no longer of importance; his life seemed very different to Heynse or Goethe, who 
both, if not in equal measure, contributed to the emergence of his symbolic image 
and the myth conducive to the popularisation of Winckelmann’s views.
3 G.W.F. Hegel, Asthetik. Nach der zweiten Ausgabe Heinrich Gustav Hothos (1842) redigiert 
und tnit einem ausfohrlichen Register versehen von Friedrich Bassenge, Berlin and Weimar, 
1976, p. 71: “Ohnehin war fruher schon Winckelmann durch die Anschauung der Ideale der 
Alten in einer Weide begeistert, durch welche er einen neuen Sinn for die Kunstbetrachtung 
aufgetan, sie den Gesichtspunkten gemeiner Zwecke und bloBen Naturnachahmung entris- 
sen und in den Kunstwerken und der Kunstgeschichte die Kunstidee zu linden machtig auf- 
gefordert hat. Denn Winckelmann ist als einer der Menschen anzusehen, welche im Felde 
der Kunst for den Geist ein neues Organ und ganz neue Betrachtungsweisen zu erschliefien 
wuBten”.
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At this point the image of Winckelmann seems to drift out of focus; his life seems 
inseparably intertwined with his vision of the ancient Hellas, his aims become reality 
almost in the natural course of things; Winckelmann’s biography appears to be a mis­
sion fulfilled, not only in the dimension of an individual existence. There is no place 
for coincidence or doubt; finally, in the interpretation of Walter Pater, approximately 
sixty years after Goethe’s famous essay of 1805, Winckelmann turns into the last man 
of the Renaissance.
Yet the complexity of the figure of Winckelmann lies not only in his artificial, 
mythologised image, created much later to be the keystone to the crucial myth of 
a “beautiful man”, a “beautiful soul”, in a manifold manner related to the concept 
of the “religion of art”. To himself, the nearly-religious veneration of ancient art and 
Raphael was a justification and a fulfilment of an elected path. His letters, a text equal 
in importance to Rousseau’s Confessions when it comes to revealing the spiritual anxi­
eties of a man living in the latter half of the eighteenth century, present his life from 
a religious perspective. In his biography, the vision of the religion of art is prepared, 
preceded and legitimated by the conviction of his divine calling.
The most touching evidence of that conviction is found in his letter, dated 6th Jan­
uary 1753, to Georg Berendis. Winckelmann was trying to convince his friend that 
his decision to leave for Rome, linked with the unavoidable condition of converting 
to Catholicism, could be treated neither as apostasy, nor as volatility of character or 
longing for a change, “Liebe zur Veranderung”. Rejecting accusations, he presented 
his decision, from the typical perspective of an Enlightenment (auto)biography, as 
perfectionist self-fulfilment and challenge to the world; religious belief was viewed 
not as an obstacle, but as a measure of effort. Winckelmann flawlessly adjusted the 
modern model of individual realisation to the traditional Providentialist vision.
His point of departure was the classical notion of being born in the wrong place 
and time - in effect, Winckelmann professed it was his misfortune to be born in 
a lace where he was unable to follow his inclinations or to shape his own personality 
himself. Germany, which he later called “Land der Marteley”, he associated mostly 
with the poverty and destitution he had to overcome on his way to education and 
knowledge. To him, to tread the path to knowledge invariably meant to reject every­
thing that was commonplace, accepted and everyday, because it was a path toward 
self-ennoblement.
To a man intent on reaching the highest levels possible, “auf hochste zu trei- 
ben”, and desirous of devoting himself to the study of the ancients, Rome must have 
seemed a promised land; no price was too high to be worth paying. His breakthrough 
decision to convert to Catholicism was described by Winckelmann as a fight, an argu­
ment between the nearly-allegorical figures of the Muses and the “Eusebias” (piety 
was also understood as fidelity). Contrary to his own reason, the protectresses of the 
arts triumphed, of course; yet their triumph was only apparent, since it is the love of 
science which allowed a man to aim higher, above the “etliche theatralische Gauke- 
leien”.
Perhaps Winckelmann’s renunciation of his ancestral faith was no more than 
a gesture. He knew that religious denomination was subordinate to true faith (if only 
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in oneself), since the few elect could be found in all churches. Almost imperceptibly, 
the natural religion of the Enlightenment merged in him with the trust, equally char­
acteristic to the Enlightenment, in the truth of the feeling, transformed by Winckel- 
mann into a Pauline heartfelt faith, opposed to the dead letter of a gesture. All this is 
dominated by an unflinching perception of being among the elect, so crucial to Lu­
theranism and its pietistic revival. This key passage of Winckelmann’s letter is worth 
quoting in full:
Der Finger des Allmachtigen, die Erste Spur seines Wirkens in uns, das ewige 
Gesetz und allgemeine Ruf ist unser Instinkt: Demselben muKt du und ich, 
aller Widersetzlichkcit ohngeachtet, folgen. Dieses ist die offene Bahn vor 
uns. Auf derselben hat uns der Schopfer der Vernunft zur Fiihrerin gegeben: 
Wir wiirden wie Phaeton Ziigel und Bahn ohne dieselbe verlieren. Pflichten, 
welche aus diesem Prinzipio fliessen, vereinigen alle Menschen in eine Familie 
zusammen. Hierin bestand bis auf Mosen Gesetz und die Propheten. Die 
folgenden gottlichen Offenbarungen erhalten ihre Uberzeugung nicht durch 
den toten Buchstaben, sondem durch gottliche Riihrungen, die ich, wie vie- 
len Glaubigen geschehen, billig auch an sich in stiller Anbetung erwarte.4
4 J.W Goethe, Winckelmann undsein Jahrhundert in Briefen und Aufsdtzen, Einleitung und Regis­
ter von H. Holtzhauer, Leipzig, 1969, pp. 52-53.
5 The following passage is also found in the same letter to Berendis: “Gott aber kann kein 
Mensch betriigen, wir schlossen derm von Gott auf uns und wechselweise”. To oppose election 
would be not so much to break a divine prohibition, but to reject a promise.
Referring to the general feeling of humanity, common to all human beings, Winckel- 
mann anchored it in a confession of unshakeable trust in God’s truthfulness and free­
dom from all error,5 evident in the purity of design, and consequently the decisiveness 
in putting plans into action.
However, perhaps surprisingly, to Winckelmann art was not the ultimate goal in 
life; it was more of a surest route to reject everything that was commonplace and to 
achieve the much-desired freedom. Freedom in the personal perspective, which to 
the German antiquarian merged with the desire of friendship, was linked to the proj­
ect of an artistic reform that had the form of a paradoxical relationship: to become 
unsurpassable, one has to equal the Greeks. Thus, the Greeks had to be imitated.
Imitation of the Greeks is an antithesis of bondage; thanks to the Greeks one may 
draw from the source of Nature, that is truth and beauty, and to restore the nobility of 
feeling as the very core of artistic expression (Bernini’s output constitutes a necessary 
antithesis here). The revival of art which is the complex process of restoring the king­
dom of ideal beauty, must, therefore, also take place on the ethical plane. Winckel­
mann anchored his apology of individual freedom as the principle of friendship in 
a certain, by no means uncontroversial, historical contrast. In his correspondence 
with Berendis he made the following confession:
Mein Gott! Ich weifl wohl, dergleichen Freundschaft, wie ich suche und kulti- 
viere, ist ein Phonix, von welchem viele reden und den keiner gesehen. In al­
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len neueren Zeiten ist mir nur ein einziges Exempel bekannt zwischen Marco 
Barbarigo und Francesco Trevisano, zweien Nobili di Venetia, [...]. Dieser 
gottlichen Freundschaft sollte ein Denkmal an alien Toren der Welt, an alien 
Tempeln und Schulen zum Unterricht der Menschenkinder, ein Denkmal, 
wo mdglichaereperennius gesetzt wearden. [...] Eine von der Ursachen der 
Seltneheit dieser nach meiner Einsicht grobten menschlichen Tugend liegt 
mir an der Religion, in der wir erzogen sind. Auf alles, was sie befiehlt oder 
anpreist, sind zeitliche und ewige Belohnungen gelegt. Die Privat-Freunschaft 
ist im ganzen neuen Testament nicht einmal dem Namen nach gedacht, wie 
ich unumstoBlich beweisen kann, und es ist vielleicht ein Gluck vor die 
Freundschaft, den sonst bliebe gar kein Platz vor den Uneigennutz.6
6 Goethe, Winckelmann (n. 4 above), p. 68.
7 For the very ambiguous issue of friendship in Winckelmann’s letters and writings, where the 
Christian idea of the love of a fellow human being as the foundation of friendship was replaced 
by the ancient model of heroic friendship as a virtue unsupported by a promise of reward in the 
afterlife, see M. Disselkamp Die Stadt der Gelehrten. Studien zu Johann Joachim Winckelmanns 
Briefen aus Rom, Tubingen, 1993, pp. 258-267. Disselkamp points out that Winckelmann drew 
directly from Shaftesbury’s reflections on the virtue of friendship, in which its true meaning was 
revealed only after the principle of its Christian justification was rejected; the prefect autonomy 
of friendship, as it were, finds corroboration in its enthusiastic dimension, which was particularly 
fascinating to Winckelmann because he perceived the love of beautiful works of art, enthusiastic 
by definition, to be a tool directing towards real friendship and strengthening it; Disselkamp, 
Die Stadt (see above), pp. 260, 263-264. Naturally, such friendship, bom of the harmony of 
souls contemplating the beauty of ancient statues, permitted to cross over the social differ­
ences: beauty created the deepest, entirely elite unity of mutually equal souls. The appreciation 
of Greek art, indicative of a distance from the world, guaranteed equality of feeling and desire 
- the needs may have been different, but the aesthetic longing was the same. Only due to this 
longing the ideal aim of friendship could be fulfilled - “Ruhe und Zufriedenheit”.
8 Disselkamp demonstrates how Winckelmann’s myth of Rome, which was a refutation of the 
high standing ol the cosmopolitan Paris, combines a critique of the aristocratic “Kavalierstour” 
with a rejection of the narrow, limited model of scholarly and antiquarian pedantry that was 
often the only reason to make the journey to the Eternal City. Winckelmann replaced such 
cultural attitudes with the elevated ideal of shaping one’s own cultural identity through the de­
Regardless o£ whether the New Testament really does not contain any remark on such 
“Privat-Freundschaft”,7 his evaluation clearly demonstrates the exceptional role that 
the ancient world played in his thinking. Idealisation of the ancient culture and nature 
constitutes a constant, crucial backdrop to the homoerotic dimension of his wished- 
for friendship, yet Winckelmann’s intentions seem to reach deeper, to Greece as the 
real haven of art and beauty.
Having said this, the glory of Greece lay dormant. Winckelmann’s ambition was 
to open the artists’ eyes to Hellenic beauty; he strongly emphasised that he meant 
artists, not any “Kavaliere”, because to Rome, those “kommen als Narren her und 
gehen als Esel wieder weg”. Such men, he added, were unworthy of time spent on 
their education - just like the French, because, as he unceremoniously and mercilessly 
wrote, they were the greatest blockheads among the moderns, and a Frenchman and 
antiquity were mutually antithetical.8
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It comes as no surprise that to Winckelmann, even the best works of the “mo­
dernite” seemed weak, artificial and unnatural in comparison with an average work 
of ancient art. The dislike of France, evident in his letters and writings, was a pars 
pro toto, emblematic of the critique of the entire culture of the Rococo, the modern 
culture which was an amusement for the elites, a formally absurd plaything empty of 
aesthetic dignity, noble contours of the Antiquity or moral solemnity.
Thus, the author of Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums characteristically re-orien­
ted the famous “Querelle”, making his contemporary culture a partial hostage to the 
ancient perfection, and a partial tool for the criticism of modernity. The notion of the 
“modernite” is not accidental here, although it does not yet contain overtones which 
were later crucial to Stendhal or Baudelaire. A more important issue is the relation­
ship of various aspects of the “Querelle” to the emergence of aesthetics and birth of 
the religion of art in the mid eighteenth century.
As an uncompromising champion of the Antiquity, Winckelmann took up topics 
important to the participants of the “Querelle”, but in a most unusual manner. His 
plan, so to speak, was to retain the religious overtone of the Enlightenment perfec­
tionist project that, after all, was of an emancipative and often anti-religious charac­
ter, yet concurrently to weaken the Progressivist dictate of the eulogists of modernity. 
Simply put, Winckelmann felt obliged to defend the ideal, immutable status of Greek 
sculpture’s beauty against the expansionist designs of modern relativism, yet to recon­
cile this status with the unavoidable and indisputable phenomenon of the transforma­
tion of artistic forms.
To say that the author of Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums encountered the clas­
sical dilemma of the discrepancy between the promise of theory and the factuality of 
history would be true, but not absolutely true. In Winckelmann’s case, it is impossible 
to dissociate the issues of history and theory from the biographic aspect, his image 
of himself. The aesthetics of perfect beauty of the Antiquity, viewed as an axis of 
a quasi-religious reverence for art, led him unswervingly towards fulfilling his mission 
and achieving a state of personal happiness. Experiencing life went hand in hand with 
the happiness-inducing contact with art, while an elevated style of literary ecphrasis 
and the act of losing oneself in the aesthetic contemplation were necessary conditions 
for an interpretation of artistic form culminating in the experience of ideal beauty. 
A viewer in communion with the beauty of, say, the Belvedere Apollo, experiences an 
elevation and a diminution at the same time. The historical framework and emotional 
depth, however, are not provided by Christianity.
Winckelmann, similar to many other scholars of his time, accepted the mechan­
ics of the development of artistic form entrenched in the historiography of art since 
Vasari, deriving from historical stylistic descriptions of ancient rhetoric and from the 
implied Enlightenment theory of culture. In this mechanics, pictorial arts, like other 
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human achievements, were viewed as born out of necessity; for instance, the earliest 
representations of the human figure featured only the necessary: the contour of the 
figure as it is in reality, not as it seems to be. From this “simplicity of shape” art could 
depart in search of the highest beauty. Its manifestation was the ability to unify forms 
and to represent a homogenous image; yet art later lost this unity of vision and was 
mired in decorativeness, excess and artificiality.
It is easy to find that this register of virtues and vices, typical to many authors 
of the Enlightenment, was compiled upon the principle of departure from the ide­
al measure of beauty on the one hand, and from simplicity and non-falsification of 
nature on the other. Nevertheless, this “noble simplicity and composed greatness”, 
adagium, to which the dangerous simplification of Winckelmann’s views is due,9 per­
fectly demonstrates the fusion of arguments of an aesthetic and ethical nature. It 
does this only from our perspective, however: to the author of that famous adagium, 
or to Shaftesbury for instance, these arguments were impossible to dissociate. The 
conception of beauty, neo-Platonic in its spirit, actually required the combination of 
the two spheres. Achieving the prefect shape of ideal beauty, art (Greek, of course, 
this is implicitly understood) becomes in reality the measure of nature, and that in 
a twofold dimension. Since then, nature must be viewed through the Greek forms, 
while those forms, seen properly in their homogeneity of shape, become the measure 
of the inner spiritual and emotional harmony of the viewer. Greek art, like music in 
Platonic or Aristotelian thought, began to cooperate in creating the ethical character 
of the modern man, the “beautiful man”, whose Utopian myth was later developed 
by Schiller and Goethe.
9 As has often been demonstrated, Winckelmann was not the author of those terms, but applied 
them fittingly and thus popularised them; they derive from the mystical theological tradition; 
see W Stammler, ‘Edie Einfalt: Zur Geschichte eines kunsttheoretischen Topos’, in: W Stam- 
mler, Wort und Bild, Berlin, 1962, pp. 161-190.
10 On the description of Apollo see: H. Zeller, Winckelmanns Beschreibung des Apollo im Belvedere, 
Zurich, 1955, where all the earlier versions and the published one are compared.
Thus the logic of artistic forms developing in sequence from the “archaic” neces­
sity through the freedom of classical form towards anarchy and decfine, in no way 
infringe the indisputable superiority of the Greeks, deriving from power, maturity and 
closeness to nature, the not yet broken link between the freedom of an individual and 
the energy of a community, between beauty and truth. Conditions of the beautiful, 
Greek humanity were the gymnastic fitness, which Winckelmann associated with the 
“swift Indian”, as well as the freedom of paideutic development unfettered by science 
or religion. Looking at a Greek statue not only transports the viewer to a universe of 
perfect form and unspoilt natural shape, but moreover opens before him a staggering 
vision of the transformation of shape into a mythical, religious region of experiencing 
the world and the past.
This is exacdy the case with Winckelmann’s two crucial ecphrases, of the Belve­
dere Torso and Apollo.10 Their common features are a desire to achieve the elevated, 
poetic effect of a euphoric character, and a high style that, not quite in concord with
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the implied violence of feeling, suggests restrained pathos; they differ in the location 
of the viewer/reader in the space of the literary expression.
The fragmentary torso of Hercules, strong, imposing and evocative precisely be­
cause of its deficiency and incompleteness, presents a challenge to the classical prin­
ciple of integritas and thus, addressing the reader, Winckelmann professes it to be 
impossible to express. It is indeed true that a description of this sculpture demands 
an imaginative completion, achieved by comparisons with the forms found in nature 
and references to the myth of the hero. \et the deficiency of shape is not an absence 
of form, because the energy of its influence increases with its affinity to the inexhaust­
ible vitality of nature (let us recall that Hercules is described as a “fallen oak” and 
“ocean”). Invited by the poet-historian into the world of the hero, the reader is thus 
drawn into the primordial universe of nature; this slightly resembles William Hazlitt’s 
later treatment of the description of Poussin’s Orion. Excellence of form overcomes 
the distance between the work and the viewer; his admiration indicates emotional 
involvement.
The description of Apollo had a different aim. What was being described was, 
after all, a statue of a divinity; this required an elevation above all human matters. 
It has been noted that Winckelmann decided to publish the least poetic of the four 
existing versions of this ecphrasis, in the assessment of Horst Rudiger.11 The differ­
ence is worthy of consideration. In the first version, later rejected, the key passage 
was as follows: “Er [Apollo] hat der Python mit Pfeilen ... erleget und siehet auf das 
Ungeheuer von der Hohe seiner Genugsamkeit wie vom Olympus herab mit einem 
Blick unter welchem alle menschliche Grofie sinket und verschwindet”. The version, 
which was printed in Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums brings the image: “Er hat den 
Python ... verfolget, und sein machtiger Schritt hat ihn erreicht und erleget. Von der 
Hohe seiner Genugsamkeit geht sein erhabener Blick, wie ins Unendliche, weit uber 
seinem Sieg hinaus”.
11 H. Rudiger, ‘Winckelmanns Personlichkeit’, in: Johann Joachim Winckelmann 1768/1968, Bad 
Godesberg, 1968, p. 32.
12 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
Rudiger correctly noted that the change was practically forced upon Winckelmann 
by the actual form of the statue: Apollo indeed does not look down, but gazes into an 
indefinite space in front of him. It is a significant detail; yet the most crucial element is 
the difference in the position of the viewer. In the first version, “all human greatness” 
is totally nullified in the presence of Apollo’s divinity. In contrast to the description of 
the Torso, the distance between the viewer and the work is not broken but cancelled, 
any dialogue seems impossible; the difference in the two realities is just too great. All 
aesthetic fails in face of the totality of Apollo’s super-human beauty.
Rudiger, however, raises the question of the distance towards the religious side 
of dread aroused by a statue of a divinity; in the second edition of the ecphrasis “the 
reader is spared” this dread, which is “suspended”. Winckelmann resigned from this 
impassable chasm between the viewer and the work, because the diminution of the 
reader did not harmonise with his desired effect of religious elevation.12 Thus, in this 
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case, humanisation of the divinity was paralleled by an elevation of a human being, 
notwithstanding that it did not remove the distance altogether.13
13 Wilhelm Trapp asseses differently this role of “Distanzierung” in the description of Apollo, 
which for him is the core of the Winckelmann’s aesthetics: “Winckelmanns eigentumliche 
Mischung aus emphatisch ertraumter Einheit und gleichzeitiger Distanzierung, die Bewegung 
zwischen Nahe und Feme strukuriert nicht nur den narrative Verlauf des Textes, sondem ent- 
spricht auch jener Kombination von nahen, greifbarem Schonem und entriicktem Erhabenem, 
die die Beschreibung selbst kennzeichnet. Dieses ebenso erotische wie indentifikatorische 
Kunsterleben ist das Zentrum der winckelmannschen Asthetik” - W Trapp, Der schone Mann: 
zur Asthetik eines unmoglichen Korpers, Berlin, 2003, p. 119. Trapp discusses also some aspects 
of earlier literature on Winckelmann stressing, in opposition to Hans Zeller and Wolfgang von 
Schadewaldt, openly erotic (in the sense of “narzistisch-identifikatorisch und erotisch taxierend 
zugleich”) character of Winckelmann’s attitude towards works of art.
14 Friedrich Schlegel perhaps went still further in eulogising Winckelmann, writing: “Der Erste 
unter uns, der die intelektuelle Anschauung der Moral gehabt, und das Urbild vollendeter 
Menschheit in den Gestalten der Kunst und des Altertums erkannte und gottbegeister ver- 
kiindigte, war der heilige Winckelmann”; quoted after: W Rehm, Griechenlum und Goethezeit. 
Geschichte eines Glauhens, Leipzig, 1938, p. 16.
It is clear, therefore, that the author of the ecphrasis of Apollo endowed it with 
various functions. Apollo, as an embodiment of ideal beauty and simultaneously its 
creator and protector, should be a symbolic and manifest definition of the role of 
beauty as a guide towards an experience of a religious nature: to the divinity, honour, 
pietas, is due. What is crucial here is not at all the supposed, and much admired by 
Goethe, revival of the pagan spirit in the soul of the German antiquarian. Winckel­
mann moved away from the radicalism of the first version of his description because 
he feared the diminution of human dignity. He was aware that the situation of the 
absolute, all-encompassing domination of divine reality would constitute despotism 
of form which would in turn preclude admiration and contemplation, thus thwarting 
the artistic sense of the form. The visionary Platonic scene of pure ideal cognition is 
a scene of pure intellect, a scene of a dialogue between gods, not humans with gods. 
Yet although Heynse in his enthusiasm called Winckelmann by the ancient, noble 
name of theios aner, in reality Winckelmann was not a “holy man” who imitated gods, 
and he did not seem to see himself as such.14
Thus, it may be assumed that his project of the “religion of art”, although contain­
ing a totalistic aspiration to veneration of art as a path towards the elevated religion 
of beauty, the land of freedom and perfection, does not aspire to an absolutism of 
artistic form. Winckelmann was more attracted to the Utopian vision of a revival 
of conditions which would permit it to regain its ideal glow and be surrounded by 
religious devotion and veneration. It is not the image of the Madonna or the resur­
rected Christ that were an embodiment of ideal beauty - this was achieved by art in 
symbiosis with a different form of religiosity.
Winckelmann, as has already been mentioned, locating the idea of freedom in the 
forefront, noticed chiefly the ease and naturalness which in his opinion were the pro­
tective spirits of paganism. Greek religion was free from dogma - myth, a condition 
for creative independence, was its opposite; a Greek was not bound by any practices 
which would be against the naturalness of the human movement, gesture or grace of
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deportment. When a Greek suffered - for instance in the Laokoon — it was not the ug­
liness of physical suffering that was immediately visible, but the grandeur of the soul 
and the nobility of expression. Art, in its drive to present ideal nature, attempted to 
achieve what might be called a “de-sensualisation” of form,15 ennoblement of shape, 
but also moved towards a certain paradox. In Winckelmann’s view, the form, while 
not ceasing to fulfil its noble metaphysical calling, was in reality, perhaps chiefly, an 
appeal to the viewer’s perception. Neither the commonplace, if to a certain extent 
justified by later solutions, antithesis of spiritual contents, idea or sensual form, nor 
the organic metaphors of growth give justice to Winckelmann’s position. He never 
accepted this art, while revealing the levels of ideal beauty or ethical elevation, might 
stop being art.
15 In her important article, Barbara Maria Stafford analyses the key metaphors of water, mirror 
and space that appear in Winckelmann’s writings, and the fundamental oppositions, for ex­
ample depth - surface, inner - outer, visible - invisible. Presenting the aesthetic and metaphysi­
cal dimension of the “noble contour” within the network of these opposition, she ascertains 
that the ever-present antinomies of Winckelmann’s descriptions are truth - appearance, and 
visible - invisible. Paradoxically, in attempting to dematerialise form, Winckelmann located 
meaning within it, not outside: “Meaning, as it were, floats up to and extends just under the 
plane with which it becomes imperceptibly bound; it does not come forth. For Winckelmann, 
the compressed dimension which art inhabits is no longer located at some indefinite zenith but 
dwells in the flat, yet slightly swollen, border of an indeterminate horizon whose existence is 
made possible only within a neutral space, lite self-sufficiency of this space lends itself to the 
dematerialisation of the representation, its precipitation into extreme visual tenuousness just 
as, concomittantly, space becomes emptied due to the condensation of the pictorial aggregate” 
- B.M. Stafford, ‘Beauty of the Invisible: Winckelmann and the Aesthetics of Imperceptibil- 
ity’, Zeitschrift fur Kunstgeschichte, 43, 1980, no. 1, pp. 69-70. Cf. also A. Potts, Flesh and the 
Ideal: Winckelmann and the Origins of Art History, New Haven, 1994, p. Ill, on the “almost 
substanceless image” which affects the viewer the most due to its purity. It must be recalled that 
in Winckelmann’s writings the antynomy of the visible - the invisible may acquire an opposite 
sense: what is visible to senses is subordinate to what is truly visible, if invisible, and what must 
be seen.
Thus, the question is, again, whether the conviction regarding the sensualist char­
acter of beauty, so widespread in the eighteenth century, ever existed in a pure form. 
Winckelmann himself would not agree it did, not only due to his attachment to the 
Platonic, or rather neo-Platonic universe of beauty exceeding sensual perception. 
Pure sensuality of form does not, after all, explain transformations in artistic forms or 
the manner in which they might pave the way to religion and religious veneration. For 
this, aesthetics needed and ally; yet having found it in history, paid a no mean price. 
This issue, however, belongs to a different order of the history of art and culture of 
the Enlightenment and Romantic revolution.
(Translated by Klaudyna Michalowicz)
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